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Abstract 
A major source of risk in project management is inaccurate forecasts of project costs, 
demand, and other impacts. The paper presents a promising new approach to mitigating 
such risk, based on theories of decision making under uncertainty which won the 2002 
Nobel prize in economics. First, the paper documents inaccuracy and risk in project 
management. Second, it explains inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation. Third, the theoretical basis is presented for a promising new method 
called "reference class forecasting," which achieves accuracy by basing forecasts on 
actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects and thereby bypassing 
both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Fourth, the paper presents the first 
instance of practical reference class forecasting, which concerns cost forecasts for large 
transportation infrastructure projects. Finally, potentials for and barriers to reference 
class forecasting are assessed. 
 
 
The American Planning Association Endorses Reference Class Forecasting 
In April 2005, based on a study of inaccuracy in demand forecasts for public works 
projects by Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2005), the American Planning Association 
(APA) officially endorsed a promising new forecasting method called "reference class 
forecasting" and made the strong recommendation that planners should never rely solely 
on conventional forecasting techniques when making forecasts: 
 
 "APA encourages planners to use reference class forecasting in addition to tradi-
tional methods as a way to improve accuracy. The reference class forecasting 
method is beneficial for non-routine projects ... Planners should never rely solely on 
civil engineering technology as a way to generate project forecasts" (the American 
Planning Association 2005). 
 
Reference class forecasting is based on theories of decision making under uncertainty 
that won Princeton psychologist Daniel Kahneman the Nobel prize in economics in 2002 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979a, b; Kahneman 1994). Reference class forecasting 
promises more accuracy in forecasts by taking a so-called "outside view" on prospects 
being forecasted, while conventional forecasting takes an inside view. The outside view 
on a given project is based on knowledge about actual performance in a reference class 
of comparable projects. 
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Where Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2005) briefly outlined the idea of reference class 
forecasting, this paper presents the first instance of reference class forecasting in 
practical project management. The emphasis will be on transportation project 
management, because this is where the first instance of reference class forecasting 
occurred. It should be mentioned at the outset, however, that comparative research shows 
that the problems, causes, and cures identified for transportation apply to a wide range of 
other project types including concert halls, museums, sports arenas, exhibit and 
convention centers, urban renewal, power plants, dams, water projects, IT systems, oil 
and gas extraction projects, aerospace projects, new production plants, and the 
development of new products and new markets (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003; Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003: 18-19; Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2002: 286; 
Flyvbjerg 2005). 
 
 
Inaccuracy in Forecasts 
Forecasts of cost, demand, and other impacts of planned projects have remained 
constantly and remarkably inaccurate for decades. No improvement in forecasting 
accuracy seems to have taken place, despite all claims of improved forecasting models, 
better data, etc. (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003; Flyvbjerg, Holm, and 
Buhl 2002, 2005). For transportation infrastructure projects inaccuracy in cost forecasts 
in constant prices is on average 44.7% for rail, 33.8% for bridges and tunnels, and 20.4% 
for roads (see Table 1).i For the 70-year period for which cost data are available, 
accuracy in cost forecasts has not improved. Average inaccuracy for rail passenger 
forecasts is –51.4%, with 84% of all rail projects being wrong by more than ±20%. For 
roads, average inaccuracy in traffic forecasts is 9.5%, with half of all road forecasts 
being wrong by more than ±20% (see Table 2). For the 30-year period for which demand 
data are available, accuracy in rail and road traffic forecasts has not improved. 
 
When cost and demand forecasts are combined, for instance in the cost-benefit analyses 
that are typically used to justify large transportation infrastructure investments, the 
consequence is inaccuracy to the second degree. Benefit-cost ratios are often wrong, not 
only by a few percent but by several factors. This is especially the case for rail projects 
(Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003, 37-41). As a consequence, estimates of 
viability are often misleading, as are socioeconomic and environmental appraisals, the 
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accuracy of which are all heavily dependent on demand and cost forecasts. These results 
point to a significant problem in transportation project management: More often than not 
the information that managers use to decide whether to invest in new projects is highly 
inaccurate and biased making projects highly risky. Comparative studies show that 
transportation projects are no worse than other project types in this respect (Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003). 
 
 
Explaining Inaccuracy 
Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002, 2004, 2005) and Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) tested 
technical, psychological, and political-economic explanations for inaccuracy in 
forecasting. Technical explanations are most common in the literature and they explain 
inaccuracy in terms of unreliable or outdated data and the use of inappropriate 
forecasting models (Vanston and Vanston 2004: 33). However, when such explanations 
are put to empirical test they do not account well for the available data. First, if technical 
explanations were valid one would expect the distribution of inaccuracies to be normal or 
near-normal with an average near zero. Actual distributions of inaccuracies are 
consistently and significantly non-normal with averages that are significantly different 
from zero. Thus the problem is bias and not inaccuracy as such. Second, if imperfect data 
and models were main explanations of inaccuracies, one would expect an improvement 
in accuracy over time, since in a professional setting errors and their sources would be 
recognized and addressed, for instance through referee processes with scholarly journals 
and similar critical expert reviews. Undoubtedly, substantial resources have been spent 
over several decades on improving data and forecasting models. Nevertheless, this has 
had no effect on the accuracy of forecasts as demonstrated above. This indicates that 
something other than poor data and models is at play in generating inaccurate forecasts. 
This finding has been corroborated by interviews with forecasters (Flyvbjerg and Cowi 
2004; Flyvbjerg and Lovallo in progress; Wachs 1990). 
 
Psychological and political explanations better account for inaccurate forecasts. 
Psychological explanations account for inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias, that is, a 
cognitive predisposition found with most people to judge future events in a more positive 
light than is warranted by actual experience. Political explanations, on the other hand, 
explain inaccuracy in terms of strategic misrepresentation. Here, when forecasting the 
outcomes of projects, forecasters and managers deliberately and strategically 
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overestimate benefits and underestimate costs in order to increase the likelihood that it is 
their projects, and not the competition's, that gain approval and funding. Strategic 
misrepresentation can be traced to political and organizational pressures, for instance 
competition for scarce funds or jockeying for position. Optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation are both deception, but where the latter is intentional, i.e., lying, the 
first is not, optimism bias is self-deception. Although the two types of explanation are 
different, the result is the same: inaccurate forecasts and inflated benefit-cost ratios. 
However, the cures to optimism bias are different from the cures to strategic 
misrepresentation, as we will see below. 
 
Explanations of inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias have been developed by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979a) and Lovallo and Kahneman (2003). Explanations in terms of 
strategic misrepresentation have been set forth by Wachs (1989,1990) and Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, and Buhl (2002, 2005). As illustrated schematically in Figure 1, explanations in 
terms of optimism bias have their relative merit in situations where political and 
organizational pressures are absent or low, whereas such explanations hold less power in 
situations where political pressures are high. Conversely, explanations in terms of 
strategic misrepresentation have their relative merit where political and organizational 
pressures are high, while they become immaterial when such pressures are not present. 
Thus, rather than compete, the two types of explanation complement each other: one is 
strong where the other is weak, and both explanations are necessary to understand the 
phenomenon at hand--the pervasiveness of inaccuracy in forecasting--and  how to curb 
it. 
 
In what follows a forecasting method called "reference class forecasting" is presented, 
which bypasses human bias--including optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation--by 
cutting directly to outcomes. In experimental research carried out by Daniel Kahneman 
and others, this method has been demonstrated to be more accurate than conventional 
forecasting methods (Kahneman and Tversky 1979a, 1979 b; Kahneman 1994; Lovallo 
and Kahneman 2003). First the theoretical and methodological foundations for reference 
class forecasting are explained, then the first instance of reference class forecasting in 
project management is presented. 
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The Planning Fallacy and Reference Class Forecasting 
The theoretical and methodological foundations of reference class forecasting were first 
described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979b) and later by Lovallo and Kahneman 
(2003). Reference class forecasting was originally developed to compensate for the type 
of cognitive bias that Kahneman and Tversky found in their work on decision making 
under uncertainty, which won Kahneman the Nobel prize in economics 2002 (Kahneman 
1994; Kahneman and Tversky 1979a). This work showed that errors of judgment are 
often systematic and predictable rather than random, manifesting bias rather than 
confusion, and that any corrective prescription should reflect this. They also found that 
many errors of judgment are shared by experts and laypeople alike. Finally they found 
that errors remain compelling even when one is fully aware of their nature. Thus 
awareness of a perceptual or cognitive illusion does not by itself produce a more accurate 
perception of reality, according to Kahneman and Tversky (1979b: 314). Awareness 
may, however, enable one to identify situations in which the normal faith in one's 
impressions must be suspended and in which judgment should be controlled by a more 
critical evaluation of the evidence. Reference class forecasting is a method for such 
critical evaluation. Human judgment, including forecasts, are biased. Reference class 
forecasting is a method for debiasing forecasts. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979a, b) found human judgment to be generally optimistic due 
to overconfidence and insufficient regard to distributional information. Thus people will 
underestimate the costs, completion times, and risks of planned actions, whereas they 
will overestimate the benefits of the same actions. Lovallo and Kahneman (2003: 58) call 
such common behavior the "planning fallacy" and they argue that it stems from actors 
taking an "inside view" focusing on the constituents of the specific planned action rather 
than on the outcomes of similar actions that have already been completed. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979b) argue that the prevalent tendency to underweigh or ignore 
distributional information is perhaps the major source of error in forecasting. "The 
analysts should therefore make every effort to frame the forecasting problem so as to 
facilitate utilizing all the distributional information that is available," say Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979b: 316). This may be considered the single most important piece of advice 
regarding how to increase accuracy in forecasting through improved methods. Using 
such distributional information from other ventures similar to that being forecasted is 
called taking an "outside view" and it is the cure to the planning fallacy. Reference class 
forecasting is a method for systematically taking an outside view on planned actions. 
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More specifically, reference class forecasting for a particular project requires the 
following three steps: 
 
(1) Identification of a relevant reference class of past, similar projects. The class 
must be broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be 
truly comparable with the specific project. 
(2) Establishing a probability distribution for the selected reference class. 
This requires access to credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of 
projects within the reference class to make statistically meaningful conclusions. 
(3) Comparing the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to 
establish the most likely outcome for the specific project. 
 
Thus reference class forecasting does not try to forecast the specific uncertain events that 
will affect the particular project, but instead places the project in a statistical distribution 
of outcomes from the class of reference projects. In statisticians vernacular, reference 
class forecasting consists of regressing forecasters' best guess toward the average of the 
reference class and expanding their estimate of credible interval toward the 
corresponding interval for the class (Kahneman and Tversky 1979b: 326). 
 
Daniel Kahneman relates the following story about curriculum planning to illustrate how 
reference class forecasting works (Lovallo and Kahneman 2003: 61). Some years ago, 
Kahneman was involved in a project to develop a curriculum for a new subject area for 
high schools in Israel. The project was carried out by a team of academics and teachers. 
In time, the team began to discuss how long the project would take to complete. 
Everyone on the team was asked to write on a slip of paper the number of months needed 
to finish and report the project. The estimates ranged from 18 to 30 months. One of the 
team members--a distinguished expert in curriculum development--was then posed a 
challenge by another team member to recall as many projects similar to theirs as possible 
and to think of these projects as they were in a stage comparable to their project. "How 
long did it take them at that point to reach completion?", the expert was asked. After a 
while he answered, with some discomfort, that not all the comparable teams he could 
think of ever did complete their task. About 40 percent of them eventually gave up. Of 
those remaining, the expert could not think of any that completed their task in less than 
seven years, nor of any that took more than ten. The expert was then asked if he had 
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reason to believe that the present team was more skilled in curriculum development than 
the earlier ones had been. The expert said no, he did not see any relevant factor that 
distinguished this team favorably from the teams he had been thinking about. His 
impression was that the present team was slightly below average in terms of resources 
and potential. The wise decision at this point would probably have been for the team to 
break up, according to Kahneman. Instead, the members ignored the pessimistic 
information and proceeded with the project. They finally completed the project eight 
years later, and their efforts went largely wasted--the resulting curriculum was rarely 
used. 
  
In this example, the curriculum expert made two forecasts for the same problem and 
arrived at very different answers. The first forecast was the inside view; the second was 
the outside view, or the reference class forecast. The inside view is the one that the 
expert and the other team members adopted. They made forecasts by focusing tightly on 
the project at hand, considering its objective, the resources they brought to it, and the 
obstacles to its completion. They constructed in their minds scenarios of their coming 
progress and extrapolated current trends into the future. The resulting forecasts, even the 
most conservative ones, were overly optimistic. The outside view is the one provoked by 
the question to the curriculum expert. It completely ignored the details of the project at 
hand, and it involved no attempt at forecasting the events that would influence the 
project's future course. Instead, it examined the experiences of a class of similar projects, 
laid out a rough distribution of outcomes for this reference class, and then positioned the 
current project in that distribution. The resulting forecast, as it turned out, was much 
more accurate. 
  
The contrast between inside and outside views has been confirmed by systematic 
research (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002). The research shows that when people 
are asked simple questions requiring them to take an outside view, their forecasts become 
significantly more accurate. For example, a group of students enrolling at a college were 
asked to rate their future academic performance relative to their peers in their major. On 
average, these students expected to perform better than 84% of their peers, which is 
logically impossible. The forecasts were biased by overconfidence. Another group of 
incoming students from the same major were asked about their entrance scores and their 
peers' scores before being asked about their expected performance. This simple diversion 
into relevant outside-view information, which both groups of subjects were aware of, 
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reduced the second group's average expected performance ratings by 20%. That is still 
overconfident, but it is much more realistic than the forecast made by the first group 
(Lovallo and Kahneman 2003: 61). 
 
However, most individuals and organizations are inclined to adopt the inside view in 
planning new projects. This is the conventional and intuitive approach. The traditional 
way to think about a complex project is to focus on the project itself and its details, to 
bring to bear what one knows about it, paying special attention to its unique or unusual 
features, trying to predict the events that will influence its future. The thought of going 
out and gathering simple statistics about related projects seldom enters a manager's mind. 
This is the case in general, according to Lovallo and Kahneman (2003: 61-62). And it is 
certainly the case for cost and demand forecasting in transportation infrastructure 
projects. Of the several hundred forecasts reviewed in Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and 
Rothengatter (2003) and Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002, 2005), not one was a 
reference class forecast.ii 
  
While understandable, project managers' preference for the inside view over the outside 
view is unfortunate. When both forecasting methods are applied with equal skill, the 
outside view is much more likely to produce a realistic estimate. That is because it 
bypasses cognitive and political biases such as optimism bias and strategic misrepresen-
tation and cuts directly to outcomes. In the outside view project managers and forecasters 
are not required to make scenarios, imagine events, or gauge their own and others' levels 
of ability and control, so they cannot get all these things wrong. Human bias is bypassed. 
Surely the outside view, being based on historical precedent, may fail to predict extreme 
outcomes, that is, those that lie outside all historical precedents. But for most projects, 
the outside view will produce more accurate results. In contrast, a focus on inside details 
is the road to inaccuracy. 
  
The comparative advantage of the outside view is most pronounced for non-routine 
projects, understood as projects that managers and decision makers in a certain locale or 
organization have never attempted before--like building new plants or infrastructure or 
catering to new types of demand. It is in the planning of such new efforts that the biases 
toward optimism and strategic misrepresentation are likely to be largest. To be sure, 
choosing the right reference class of comparative past projects becomes more difficult 
when managers are forecasting initiatives for which precedents are not easily found, for 
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instance the introduction of new and unfamiliar technologies. However, most projects are 
both non-routine locally and use well-known technologies. Such projects are, therefore, 
particularly likely to benefit from the outside view and reference class forecasting. 
  
 
First Instance of Reference Class Forecasting in Practice 
The first instance of reference class forecasting in practice may be found in Flyvbjerg 
and Cowi (2004): Procedures for Dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning."iii 
Based on this study, in the Summer of 2004 the UK Department for Transport and HM 
Treasury decided to employ the method as part of project appraisal for large 
transportation projects.  
 
The immediate background to this decision was the revision to "The Green Book" by 
HM Treasury in 2003, that identified for large public procurement a demonstrated, 
systematic tendency for project appraisers to be overly optimistic: 
 
"There is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be overly 
optimistic. To redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, empirically 
based adjustments to the estimates of a project's costs, benefits, and duration ... [I]t is 
recommended that these adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar 
projects elsewhere"  (HM Treasury 2003b: 1).  
 
Such optimism was seen as an impediment to prudent fiscal planning, for the 
government as a whole and for individual departments within government. To redress 
this tendency HM Treasury recommended that appraisers involved in large public 
procurement should make explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a 
project’s costs, benefits, and duration. HM Treasury recommended that these 
adjustments be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere, and 
adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project at hand. In the absence of a more 
specific evidence base, HM Treasury encouraged government departments to collect 
valid and reliable data to inform future estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use 
the best available data. The Treasury let it be understood that in future the allocation of 
funds for large public procurement would be dependent on valid adjustments of 
optimism in order to secure valid estimates of costs, benefits, and duration of large 
public procurement (HM Treasury 2003a, b). 
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In response to the Treasury's Green Book and its recommendations, the UK Department 
for Transport decided to collect the type of data, which the Treasury recommended, and 
on that basis to develop a methodology for dealing with optimism bias in the planning 
and management of transportation projects. The Department for Transport appointed 
Bent Flyvbjerg in association with Cowi to undertake this assignment as regards costing 
of large transportation procurement. The main aims of the assignment were two; first, to 
provide empirically based optimism bias uplifts for selected reference classes of 
transportation infrastructure projects, and, second, to provide guidance on using the 
established uplifts to produce more realistic forecasts of capital expenditures in 
individual projects (Flyvbjerg and Cowi 2004). Uplifts would be established for capital 
expenditures based on the full business case (time of decision to build). 
 
The types of transportation schemes under the direct and indirect responsibility of the 
UK Department for Transport were divided into a number of distinct categories where 
statistical tests, benchmarkings, and other analyses showed that the risk of cost overruns 
within each category may be treated as statistically similar. For each category a reference 
class of projects was then established as the basis for reference class forecasting, as 
required by step 1 in the 3-step procedure for reference class forecasting described 
above. The specific categories and the types of project allocated to each category are 
shown in Table 3. 
 
For each category of projects, a reference class of completed, comparable transportation 
infrastructure projects was used to establish probability distributions for cost overruns for 
new projects similar in scope and risks to the projects in the reference class, as required 
by step 2 in reference class forecasting. For roads, for example, a class of 172 completed 
and comparable projects was used to establish the probability distribution of cost 
overruns shown in Figure 2. The share of projects with a given maximum cost overrun is 
shown in the figure. For instance, 40% of projects have a maximum cost overrun of 10%; 
80% of projects a maximum overrun of 32%, etc. For rail, the probability distribution is 
shown in Figure 3, and for bridges and tunnels in Figure 4. The figures show that the risk 
of cost overrun is substantial for all three project types, but highest for rail, followed by 
bridges and tunnels, and with the lowest risk for roads. 
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Based on the probability distributions described above the required uplifts needed to 
carry out step 3 in a reference class forecast may be calculated as shown in Figures 5-7. 
The uplifts refer to cost overrun calculated in constant prices. The lower the acceptable 
risk for cost overrun, the higher the uplift. For instance, with a willingness to accept a 
50% risk for cost overrun in a road project, the required uplift for this project would be 
15%. If the Department for Transport were willing to accept only a 10% risk for cost 
overrun, then the required uplift would be 45%. In comparison, for rail with a 
willingness to accept a 50% risk for cost overrun, the required uplift would be 40%. If 
the Department for Transport were willing to accept only a 10% risk for cost overrun, 
then the required uplift would be 68% for rail. All three figures share the same basic S-
shape, but at different levels, demonstrating that the required uplifts are significantly 
different for different project categories for a given level of risk of cost overrun. The 
figures also show that the cost for additional reductions in the risk of cost overrun is 
different for the three types of projects, with risk reduction becoming increasingly 
expensive (rising marginal costs) for roads and fixed links below 20% risk, whereas for 
rail the cost of increased risk reduction rises more slowly, albeit from a high level.  
 
Table 4 presents an overview of applicable optimism bias uplifts for the 50% and 80% 
percentiles for all the project categories listed in Table 3. The 50% percentile is pertinent 
to the investor with a large project portfolio, where cost overruns on one project may be 
offset by cost savings on another. The 80% percentile--corresponding to a risk of cost 
overrun of 20%--is the level of risk that the UK Department for Transport is typically 
willing to accept for large investments in local transportation infrastructure. 
 
The established uplifts for optimism bias should be applied to estimated budgets at the 
time of decision to build a project. In the UK, the approval stage for a large 
transportation project is equivalent to the time of presenting the business case for the 
project to the Department for Transport with a view to obtaining the go or no-go for that 
project.  
 
If, for instance, a group of project managers were preparing the business case for a new 
motorway, and if they or their client had decided that the risk of cost overrun must be 
less than 20%, then they would use an uplift of 32% on their estimated capital 
expenditure budget. Thus, if the initially estimated budget were £100 million, then the 
final budget--taking into account optimism bias at the 80%-level--would be £132 million 
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(£1 = $1.8). If the project managers or their client decided instead that a 50% risk of cost 
overrun was acceptable, then the uplift would be 15% and the final budget £115 million.  
 
Similarly, if a group of project managers were preparing the business case for a metro 
rail project, and if they or their client had decided that with 80% certainty they wanted to 
stay within budget, then they would use an uplift on capital costs of 57%. An initial 
capital expenditure budget of £300 million would then become a final budget of £504 
million. If the project managers or their client required only 50% certainty they would 
stay within budget, then the final budget would be £420 million. 
 
It follows that the 50% percentile should be used only in instances where investors are 
willing to take a high degree of risk that cost overrun will occur and/or in situations 
where investors are funding a large number of projects and where cost savings 
(underruns) on one project may be used to cover the costs of overruns on other projects. 
The upper percentiles (80-90%) should be used when investors want a high degree of 
certainty that cost overrun will not occur, for instance in stand-alone projects with no 
access to additional funds beyond the approved budget. Other percentiles may be 
employed to reflect other degrees of willingness to accept risk and the associated uplifts 
as shown in Figures 5-7. 
 
Only if project managers have evidence to substantiate that they would be significantly 
better at estimating costs for the project at hand than their colleagues were for the 
projects in the reference class would the managers be justified in using lower uplifts than 
those described above. Conversely, if there is evidence that the project managers are 
worse at estimating costs than their colleagues, then higher uplifts should be used. 
 
The methodology described above for systematic, practical reference class forecasting 
for transportation projects was developed 2003-2004 with publication by the Department 
of Transport in August 2004. From this date local authorities applying for funding for 
transportation projects with the Department for Transport or with HM Treasury were 
required to take into account optimism bias by using uplifts as described above and as 
laid out in more detail in guidelines from the two ministries.  
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Forecasting Costs for the Edinburgh Tram 
In October 2004, the first instance of practical use of the uplifts was recorded, in the 
planning of the Edinburgh Tram Line 2. Ove Arup and Partners Scotland (2004) had 
been appointed by the Scottish Parliament's Edinburgh Tram Bill Committee to provide a 
review of the Edinburgh Tram Line 2 business case developed on behalf of Transport 
Initiatives Edinburgh. Transport Initiatives Edinburgh is project promoter and is a private 
limited company owned by the City of Edinburgh Council established to deliver major 
transport projects for the Council. The Scottish Executive is a main funder of the 
Edinburgh Tram, having made an Executive Grant of £375 million ($670 million) 
towards lines 1 and 2 of which Transport Initiatives Edinburgh proposed spending £165 
million towards Line 2. 
 
As part of their review, Ove Arup assessed whether the business case for Tram Line 2 
had adequately taken into account optimism bias as regards capital costs. The business 
case had estimated a base cost of £255 million and an additional allowance for 
contingency and optimism bias of £64 million--or  25%--resulting in total capital costs of 
app. £320 million. Ove Arup concluded about this overall estimate of capital costs that it 
seemed to have been rigorously prepared using a database of costs, comparison to other 
UK light rail schemes, and reconciliations with earlier project estimates. Ove Arup 
found, however, that the following potential additional costs needed to be considered in 
determining the overall capital costs: £26 million for future expenditure on replacement 
and renewals and £20 million as a notional allowance for a capital sum to cover risks of 
future revenue shortfalls, amounting to an increase in total capital costs of 14.4% (Ove 
Arup and Partners Scotland 2004: 15-16) 
 
Using the UK Department for Transport uplifts for optimism bias presented above on the 
base costs, Ove Arup then calculated the 80th percentile value for total capital costs--the 
value at which the likelihood of staying within budget is 80%--to be £400 million (i.e., 
£255 million x 1.57). The 50th percentile for total capital costs--the value at which the 
likelihood of staying within budget is 50%--was £357 million (i.e., £255 x 1.4). Ove 
Arup remarked that these estimates of total capital costs were likely to be conservative, 
that is, low, because the UK Department for Transport recommends that its optimism 
bias uplifts be applied to the budget at the time of decision to build, which typically 
equates to business case submission, and Tram Line 2 had not yet even reached the 
outline business case stage, indicating that risks would be substantially higher at this 
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early stage as would corresponding uplifts. On that basis Arup concluded that "it is 
considered that current optimism bias uplifts [for Tram Line 2] may have been 
underestimated" (Ove Arup and Partners Scotland 2004: 27). 
 
Finally, Ove Arup mentioned that the Department for Transport guidance does allow for 
optimism bias to be adjusted downward if strong evidence of improved risk mitigation 
can be demonstrated. According to Ove Arup, this may be the case if advanced risk 
analysis has been applied, but this was not the case for Tram Line 2. Ove Arup therefore 
concluded that "the justification for reduced Department for Transport optimism bias 
uplifts would appear to be weak" (Ove Arup and Partners Scotland 2004: 27-28). Thus 
the overall conclusion of Ove Arup was that the promoter's capital cost estimate of app. 
£320 million was optimistic. Most likely Tram Line 2 would cost significantly more. 
 
By framing the forecasting problem to allow the use of the empirical distributional 
information made available by the UK Department for Transport, Ove Arup was able to 
take an outside view on the Edinburgh Tram Line 2 capital cost forecast and thus debias 
what appeared to be a biased forecast. As a result Ove Arup's client, The Scottish 
Parliament, was provided with a more reliable estimate of what the true costs of Line 2 
was likely to be. 
 
 
Potentials and Barriers for Reference Class Forecasting 
As mentioned above, two types of explanation best account for forecasting inaccuracy, 
optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Reference class forecasting was originally 
developed to mitigate optimism bias, but reference class forecasting may help mitigate 
any type of human bias, including strategic bias, because the method bypasses such bias 
by cutting directly to empirical outcomes and building forecasts on these. Even so, the 
potentials for and barriers to reference class forecasting will be different in situations 
where (1) optimism bias is the main cause of inaccuracy as compared to situations where 
(2) strategic misrepresentation is the reason for inaccuracy. We therefore need to 
distinguish between these two types of situation when endeavoring to apply reference 
class forecasting in practice. 
 
In the first type of situation--where optimism bias is the main cause of inaccuracy--we 
may assume that managers and forecasters are making honest mistakes and have an 
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interest in improving accuracy. Consider, for example, the students mentioned above, 
who were asked to estimate their future academic performance relative to their peers. We 
may reasonably believe that the students did not deliberately misrepresent their 
estimates, because they had no interest in doing so and were not exposed to pressures 
that would push them in that direction. The students made honest mistakes, which 
produced honest, if biased, numbers regarding performance. And, indeed, when students 
were asked to take into account outside-view information, we saw that the accuracy of 
their estimates improved substantially. In this type of situation--when forecasters are 
honestly trying to gauge the future--the potential for using the outside view and reference 
class forecasting will be good. Forecasters will be welcoming the method and barriers 
will be low, because no one has reason to be against a methodology that will improve 
their forecasts. 
 
In the second type of situation--where strategic misrepresentation is the main cause of 
inaccuracy--differences between estimated and actual costs and benefits are best 
explained by political and organizational pressures. Here managers and forecasters 
would still need reference class forecasting if accuracy were to be improved, but 
managers and forecasters may not be interested in this because inaccuracy is deliberate. 
Biased forecasts serve strategic purposes that dominate the commitment to accuracy and 
truth. Consider, for example, city managers with responsibility for estimating costs and 
benefits of urban rail projects. Here, the assumption of innocence regarding outcomes 
typically cannot be upheld. Cities compete fiercely for approval and for scarce national 
funds for such projects, and pressures are strong to present projects as favorably as 
possible, that is, with low costs and high benefits, in order to beat the competition. There 
is no incentive for the individual city to debias its forecasts, but quite the opposite. 
Unless all other cities also debias, the individual city would lose out in the competition 
for funds. Project managers are on record confirming that this is a common situation 
(Flyvbjerg and Cowi 2004: 36-58; Flyvbjerg and Lovallo in progress). The result is the 
same as in the case of optimism: actors promote ventures that are unlikely to perform as 
promised. But the causes are different as are possible cures. 
 
In this type of situation the potential for reference class forecasting is low--the demand 
for accuracy is simply not there--and barriers are high. In order to lower barriers, and 
thus create room for reference class forecasting, measures of accountability must be 
implemented that would reward accurate forecasts and punish inaccurate ones. 
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Forecasters and promoters should be made to carry the full risks of their forecasts. Their 
work should be reviewed by independent bodies such as national auditors or independent 
analysts, and such bodies would need reference class forecasting to do their work. 
Projects with inflated benefit-cost ratios should be stopped or placed on hold. 
Professional and even criminal penalties should be considered for people who 
consistently produce misleading forecasts. The higher the stakes, and the higher the level 
of political and organizational pressures, the more pronounced will be the need for such 
measures of accountability. Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003) and Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, and Buhl (2005) further detail the design of such measures and how they may be 
implemented in practical project management. 
 
The existence of strategic misrepresentation does not exclude the simultaneous existence 
of optimism bias, and vice versa. In fact, it is realistic to expect such co-existence in 
forecasting in large and complex projects and organizations. This again underscores the 
point that improved forecasting methods--here reference class forecasting--and measures 
of accountability must go hand in hand if the attempt to arrive at more accurate forecasts 
is to be effective.  
 
Finally, it could be argued that in some cases the use of reference class forecasting may 
result in such large reserves set aside for a project that this would in itself lead to risks of 
inefficiencies and overspending. Reserves will be spent simply because they are there, as 
the saying goes in the construction business. For instance, it is important to recognize 
that for the abovementioned examples the introduction of reference class forecasting and 
optimism-bias uplifts would establish total budget reservations (including uplifts) which 
for some projects would be more than adequate. This may in itself create an incentive 
which works against firm cost control if the total budget reservation is perceived as being 
available to the project and its contractors. This makes it important to combine the 
introduction of reference class forecasting and optimism bias uplifts with tight contracts, 
maintained incentives for promoters to undertake good quantified risk assessment and 
exercise prudent cost control during project implementation. How this may be done is 
described in Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004). 
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Type of project Average inaccuracy 
(%) 
Standard deviation Level of significance, p 
Rail 44.7 38.4 <0.001 
Bridges and tunnels 33.8 62.4 0.004 
Road 20.4 29.9 <0.001 
 
Table 1: Inaccuracy in cost forecasts for rail, bridges, tunnels, and roads, respectively (construction 
costs, constant prices). For all project types inaccuracy is different from zero with extremely high 
significance.  
Source: Flyvbjerg database on large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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 Rail 
 
Road 
Average inaccuracy (%) -51.4 (sd=28.1) 
 
9.5 (sd=44.3) 
Percentage of projects with 
inaccuracies larger than 
±20% 
84 50 
Percentage of projects with 
inaccuracies larger than 
±40% 
72 25 
Percentage of projects with 
inaccuracies larger than 
±60% 
40 13 
 
Table 2: Inaccuracy in forecasts of rail passenger and road vehicle traffic.  
Source: Flyvbjerg database on large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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Category Types of projects 
Roads Motorway 
Trunk roads 
Local roads  
Bicycle facilities 
Pedestrian facilities  
Park and ride 
Bus lane schemes 
Guided buses on wheels 
Rail Metro 
Light rail 
Guided buses on tracks 
Conventional rail 
High speed rail 
Fixed links Bridges 
Tunnels 
Building projects Stations 
Terminal buildings 
IT projects IT system development 
Standard civil  
engineering 
Included for reference purposes only 
Non-standard civil engineering Included for reference purposes only 
 
Table 3: Categories and types of projects used as basis for reference class forecasting 
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Category Types of projects Applicable optimism bias 
uplifts 
50%  
percentile 
80% 
percentile 
Roads Motorway 
Trunk roads 
Local roads  
Bicycle facilities 
Pedestrian facilities  
Park and ride 
Bus lane schemes 
Guided buses on wheels 
15% 32% 
Rail Metro 
Light rail 
Guided buses on tracks 
Conventional rail 
High speed rail 
40% 57% 
Fixed links Bridges 
Tunnels 
23% 55% 
Building projects Stations 
Terminal buildings 
4-51%* 
IT projects IT system development 10-200%* 
Standard civil  
engineering 
Included for reference purposes only 
3-44%* 
Non-standard civil 
engineering 
Included for reference purposes only 
6-66%* 
*) Based on Mott MacDonald (2002: 32); no probability distribution available. 
Table 4: Applicable capital expenditure optimism bias uplifts for 50% and 80% percentiles, constant 
prices. 
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Figure 1: Explanatory power of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation, respectively, in 
accounting for forecasting inaccuracy as function of political and organizational pressure.  
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Figure 2: Probability distribution of cost overrun for roads, constant prices (N=172). 
Source: Flyvbjerg database on large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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Figure 3: Probability distribution of cost overrun for rail, constant prices (N=46). 
Source: Flyvbjerg database on large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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Figure 4: Probability distribution of cost overrun for fixed links, constant prices (N=34). 
Source: Flyvbjerg database on large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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Figure 5: Required uplift for roads as function of the maximum acceptable level of risk for cost 
overrun, constant prices (N=172). 
Source: Flyvbjerg database on large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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Figure 6: Required uplift for rail as function of the maximum acceptable level of risk for cost 
overrun, constant prices (N=46). 
Source: Flyvbjerg database on large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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Figure 7: Required uplift for fixed links as function of the maximum acceptable level of risk for cost 
overrun, constant prices (N=34).  
Source: Flyvbjerg database on large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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Notes 
                                                
i Inaccuracy is measured in percent as (actual outcome/forecast outcome -1)x100. The base year of a 
forecast for a project is the time of decision to build that project. An inaccuracy of 0 indicates perfect 
accuracy. Cost is measured as construction costs. Demand is measured as number of vehicles for roads and 
number of passengers for rail. 
ii The closest thing to an outside view in large infrastructure forecasting is Gordon and Wilson's (1984) use 
of regression analysis on an international cross section of light-rail projects to forecast patronage in a 
number of light-rail schemes in North America. 
iii The fact that this is, indeed, the first instance of practical reference class forecasting has been confirmed 
with Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo, who also knows of no other instances of practical reference class 
forecasting. Personal communications with Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo, author's archives. 
